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1. Introduction
It is well documented that mothers, on average, earn lower wages than women without
children. The traditional human capital model (Mincer and Polachek, 1974) suggests that
mothers may have less human capital due to child-related interruptions in work and/or lower
investment in education. However, after controlling for educational attainment, work experi-
ence and individual heterogeneity, the wage gap remains positive and significant (Budig and
Hodges, 2010, Budig and England, 2001, Phipps et al., 2001, Glauber, 2007, and Waldfogel,
1998). Most empirical studies on the child penalty estimate the wage difference between em-
ployed mothers and employed non-mothers, excluding non-working women due to the lack
of wage data.1 However, if this selection is systematically different between mothers and
non-mothers, the observed wage difference is not representative of the wage gap between all
mothers and non-mothers. Therefore, any analysis that excludes the non-working population
may incur a selection problem and lead to biased estimates of the motherhood effect.
This paper develops a simple model of fertility and work decisions to address this selection
issue. The model shows that given the same non-labor income, all childless women face the
same reservation wage and the ones who choose not to work are the lower wage earners in the
group. In contrast, the reservation wage of mothers is not only related to non-labor income,
it also varies by individual motherhood preferences. A mother with a strong preference for
time with children faces a higher reservation wage and she may not work even if her wage is
relatively high.
A large body of literature examines the effects of childbearing on labor supply. Many
studies find that childbirth lowers a woman’s probability of working (Miller, 2011, Wilde
et al., 2010, and Troske and Voicu, 2010, 2012). Loughran and Zissimopoulos (2009) use
U.S. data to estimate the size of this effect. Their results indicate that having a first child
reduces women’s working probabilities by 9.4 percentage points in the NLSY79 and by 14.3
percentage points in the NLSYW.
How much would the "drop-out" mothers make compared to whose who stay? Ejrnæs
and Kunze (2013) use data from Germany and find "negative selection" back to full-time
work after births. They calculate the predicted wage profiles for non-returning mothers and
show that their wage, on average, is higher than returning mothers. My proposed model has
two explanations for this result. First, due to marriage sorting, women with a higher wage
are more likely to marry a high-wage earner. This leads to higher non-labor income (spousal
income in this case) and a higher reservation wage for these women. Second, women with a
high wage may choose not to work if they have a strong preference for time with children.
Their opportunity cost of working is high and high wages may not necessarily compensate
for the reduced time with children.
My model suggests that mothers who do not work may have higher reservation wages.
Therefore, when non-working women are excluded from empirical analyses, the excluded
mothers may have higher potential wages than excluded non-mothers. If this is the case, the
wage difference between mothers and others will be overestimated.
2. The model
1For example, Loughran and Zissimopoulos (2009) eliminate women observations by 25
percent due to missing wages. In Miller (2011), women’s wage observations drop by 50
percent after ten years into their career.
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2.1 A model of fertility and labor supply
Consider a model where women choose time allocation among work, child care and leisure.
Time spent on work, children and leisure is denoted by , , and , respectively. If a woman
chooses not to work,  = 0 If a woman chooses not to have children,  = 0. A positive
 denotes the total time a woman spends with children. If a woman has more than one
child,  can be distributed across multiple children. Women gain utility from consumption,
time spent with children and leisure. The utility function is concave in these three inputs as
shown below
 = ln( + ) + ln( + ) + ln()
where  is the wage rate which is determined by human capital (i.e. educational attainment
and on-job training), labor market environment (i.e. the wage premium of certain occupa-
tions and contracts), and demographic characteristics (i.e. race and age). Term  is labor
income. Consumption has a second part,  ≥ 0, which is non-labor income, i.e. transfer
payment from government, spouse or parents. Term   0 denotes women’s preference for
motherhood. This motherhood preference can be affected by marital status, family back-
ground and the age of children. A lower  indicates more interest in having and raising
children. Consider the extreme case where → 0, the marginal utility of having children is
close to infinite when  = 0, so a woman chooses to be a mother and   0.




ln( + ) + ln( + ) + ln()
subject to
 +  +  ≤ 1
  ≥ 0   0
Each woman’s problem can be rewritten as the following Lagrangian
max

 = ln( + ) + ln( + ) + ln() + (1−  −  − )
The time constraint always binds,   0, since utility is increasing in all time inputs.




−  ≤ 0  ≥ 0 and ( 
 + 




−  ≤ 0  ≥ 0 and ( 1
 + 




=  and   0 (3)
 : 1−  −  −  = 0 (4)
The model can be solved analytically and there are four cases regarding women’s choice
of  and . I adopt superscript
∗ to indicate a positive value. For example, solution
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 = (∗ 0 
∗
 ) shows a woman’s choice of positive work time, zero time investment in children
and positive leisure time. This solution suggests that a woman is working, but chooses not
to have children. Since  ∈ (0 1], I remove term ∗ in all cases with the understanding that
leisure time is positive. The four cases are listed below and they are linked to observed
employment and motherhood status:
Case 1: Working childless women. Let  = (∗ 0), substituting equations (1) and (3)












Case 2: Working mothers. Let  = (∗ 
∗




 = − 23 + 1+3 ;  = ∗ = 3 + 1−23 ;  = ∗ = 3 + 1+3 
Case 3: Non-working mothers. Let  = (0 ∗), substituting equations (2) and (3) into
equation (4) and the assumption  = 0 give











Case 4: Non-working childless women. Let  = (0 0), substituting equation (3) into
equation (4) and the assumption  =  = 0 give




The model yields the following results.
Proposition 1: A sufficient condition for the choice of being a mother is  ≤ 1
2
; a
sufficient condition for the choice of being childless is  ≥ 1; When  ∈ (1
2
 1), a woman
chooses to be a mother only if the wage is low enough,  ≤ 
2−1 












 1]; or  ≥ 2
+1
and  ∈ (0 1
2
]. Next consider conditions for non-working mothers
(Case 3):  =
1−
2
≥ 0 and 
+
− ≤ 0 |  = 0 Combining  = 21+ into these constraints,
 ≤ 2
+1
and  ≤ 1 If  ≤ 1
2
, a woman chooses to be a mother (Case 2 or Case 3) regardless
of her wage. This proves the first line in proposition 1.
Consider conditions for working childless women (Case 1):  =
−
2
≥ 0 and 1
+
− ≤ 0
|  = 0. Using  = 2+ , I rewrite the conditions as  ≥ max( 2−1) and  ≥ 12  The
conditions for non-working childless women (Case 4) are 
+
−  ≤ 0 |  = 0 and
1
+
− ≤ 0 |  = 0 Given  = 1, these constraints can be combined into  ≤  and  ≥ 1
So if  ≥ 1 a woman chooses not to have children (Case 1 or Case 4) no matter what the
wage is. This proves the second line in proposition 1.
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The conditions for all cases discussed above show that the wage is relevant to a woman’s
fertility decision when  falls in the middle range. When  ∈ (1
2
 1), if  ≤ 
2−1 , a woman
chooses to have children. Otherwise, she chooses to be childless. This proves the third line
in proposition 1.
Proposition 1 indicates the importance of women’s preference for motherhood for their
fertility choice. With little preference,   1, women choose to have no children regardless
of their wage. When the motherhood preference is strong enough,   1
2
, women with all
possible wages choose to be a mother. The wage rate is relevant to women’s fertility choice
only when  is in the middle range, i.e.  ∈ (1
2
 1).
Proposition 2: For a mother, the reservation wage is 2
+1
. For a childless woman, the
reservation wage is .
Proof: The reservation wage for mothers is derived from the conditions for working
mothers (Case 2) and non-working mothers (Case 3). If the wage exceeds 2
+1
, she chooses
to work. Otherwise, she stays out of the labor force. The reservation wage, 2
+1
, is increasing
in non-labor income and the preference for children. This proves the first line in proposition
2.
The conditions for working childless women (Case 1) and non-working childless women
(Case 4) together show that the reservation wage is  for a woman with no children. This
proves the second line in proposition 2.
Notice that the reservation wage of all women is positively related to non-labor income, .
This result is consistent with empirical findings. For example, Troske and Voicu (2010) show
that husband’s wage and other non-labor income negatively affect women’s labor market
involvement. In addition to non-labor income, the child preference term, , also plays a role
in the working decisions of mothers. Mothers with a stronger preference for children (i.e.
 is small) face a higher opportunity cost of working, so their wages must exceed a higher
threshold for them to work. As a result, a non-working mother may have a higher wage
than a working mother but choose not to work, because she prefers time with children. Also
notice that the reservation wage of a mother is greater than that of a childless woman if
  1. Since this condition holds for all mothers, we can conclude that on average, mothers
face a higher reservation wage than others.
Figure 1 helps to illustrate this finding. Each of the four areas in figure 1 represents
the combinations of wage, , and preference parameter, , that correspond to women’s
employment and fertility choices. For example, area A shows that when both the wage
and preference parameter are large enough, a woman chooses to work and have no children.
Compare areas A and B which correspond to working and non-working childless women,
respectively. All points in B are below area A, which means all non-working childless women
face a lower wage compared to any working childless woman. The same is not true for areas
C and D which correspond to working and non-working mothers, respectively. There are
points in D that are above some points in C. It suggests that some non-working mothers face
a higher wage than some working mothers but they choose not to work due to a low value
of  and/or a high value of .
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Figure 1 shows the wage and preference range in which a woman chooses certain work and
motherhood status, i.e. A-working childless women; B-non-working childless women;
C-working mothers; D-non-working mothers.
In estimating the wage gap between mothers and non-mothers, excluding the non-working
population is equivalent to removing both areas B and D out of the picture. This may cause
selection bias, because some high wage earners among mothers are excluded while only low
wage earners among childless women are excluded. Consequently, the wage gap between
mothers and non-mothers may be overestimated. In an attempt to empirically address this
selection issue, Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel (2005) adopt a Heckman selection model to
account for work decisions. When they include the inverse Mills ratio in the wage regression,
the motherhood effect is reduced by more than 40 percent. Ejrnæs and Kunze (2013) account
for return to work decisions and find smaller wage declines due to child birth. Both findings
confirm the prediction of the model.
3. Conclusion
Previous studies estimate the motherhood wage penalty using wage data on working
mothers and working non-mothers. Such analysis excludes non-working women and poten-
tially leads to biased estimates due to sample selection. To characterize the potential effects
of this bias, I develop a simple model of employment and fertility choices and show that
the reservation wages of mothers and non-mothers have different forms. A higher non-labor
income leads to a lower probability of working for all women. However, mothers may have
an additional reason for not working. If they have strong preferences for time with children,
they choose to exit the labor market even though they face a high potential wage. Excluding
them in empirical analyses underestimates the average productivity of mothers. This finding
further implies that the wage gap observed in the labor market may be an overestimated
measure of the child wage effect.
This paper’s findings are particularly helpful in understanding wage inequality among
women and the wage gap between men and women. Recent studies on the child penalty
provide evidence that having children has a negative effect on a woman’s wage (Budig and
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Hodges, 2010 and Anderson et al., 2003). Motherhood choices may also be responsible for
the lower wages of women as a group (Erosa et al., 2002). I show that the decisions by
some high-earning mothers not to work partly explain the observed lower wage of mothers.
This consequently overstates the severity of the gender wage gap. If these findings are
corroborated by future work, it has important policy implications for the way we view and
address wage inequality.
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